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CHALLENGING FEDERALISM: HOW THE STATES’ LOUD 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVOCATION IS BEING MET WITH SILENCE 
 
Jennifer M. Haidar† 
 
“The peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The union 
will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.” 
–Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80 
 
 
“The fact that the Paris deal hamstrings the United States while empowering some 
of the world’s top polluting countries should expel any doubt as to why foreign lob-
byists should wish to keep our beautiful country tied up and bound down . . . That’s 
not going to happen while I’m president, I’m sorry.” 
–President Donald J. Trump 
 
 
“Trump is AWOL, but California is on the field, ready for battle.” 




                                                          
†  J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019. The author is grateful for the editorial staff on the 
Journal of Legislation for helping shape this Note with their detailed editing and insightful comments. Special 
thanks to Professor Nicole Garnett and Professor William Kelley for providing an initial framework for this 
paper. Lastly, the author would also like to thank her family, and her father George in particular, for their un-
wavering support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of the recent political response to President Donald Trump’s decision to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement,1 a protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the legislation and political responses from several 
states have called into question the stability of our federalist system.  The United 
States ratified the Paris Agreement on September 3, 2016 during the last months of 
President Barack Obama’s presidency,2 and despite President Trump’s announce-
ment to withdraw on June 1, 2017,3 the United States is nevertheless obligated to wait 
three years to announce an intention to exit the agreement.4  Following President 
Trump’s announcement, state legislators and politicians have passed unconstitutional 
statutes and conducted foreign diplomacy in an attempt to constructively ratify the 
Paris Agreement in spite of the federal government’s position. 
This Note will not explore the merits of the Paris Agreement, because regardless 
of the policy value of the agreement, the constitutional issue lies with the states’ un-
constitutional response.  By passing state legislation to uphold the Paris Agreement 
and conducting diplomacy, states have violated the Supremacy Clause5 and the 
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.6  These constitutional safeguards are in place be-
cause the American system of government relies on a stable balance of Federalism.  
Though the states have reserved many powers, the power to sign treaties and conduct 
diplomacy is not among them.  By outlining how states have increased their disregard 
for federalist checks on state power, this Note will be a helpful addition to the con-
tinuing scholarship on constitutional law.  An analysis of intention and constitution-
ality will reveal that the laws passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts and Mar-
yland go against our ingrained system of federalism and should be invalidated.  
Furthermore, the actions of several political figures also unconstitutionally encroach 
on the executive’s exclusive domain over diplomacy. 
The United States Climate Alliance (the Alliance) is the embodiment of state-
level activism in favor of the Paris Agreement, and as a signal to the growing inde-
pendence of states, they now count fifteen American states as part of their member-
ship.7  Their mandate is to encourage legislation furthering the goals of the Paris 
Agreement in spite of the federal position on the issue.8  Created as a reaction to the 
                                                          
1   Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html. 
2   Paris Agreement Status: Chapter XXVII Environment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chap-
ter=27&clang=_en. 
3   Shear, supra note 1, at 1.  
4   Paris Climate Agreement art. 28 opened for signature Dec. 12 2015, (entered into force Nov. 4, 
2016). https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/270538.pdf. 
5   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
6   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
7   About, U.S. CLIMATE ALL. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/about-us/. (These 
states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rice, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.). 
8   Alliance Principles, U.S. CLIMATE ALL. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-
principles/. 
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federal government’s announcement of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,9 the 
Alliance has been active in creating domestic support for climate change legislation, 
practicing international diplomacy, and conducting foreign affairs. When state repre-
sentatives gathered to speak in November 2017 at the Bonn Climate Conference, the 
Alliance made a diplomatic appearance and was dubbed a “shadow delegation.”10  In 
contrast to the American delegation’s booth advocating for the benefits of fossil fuels 
and natural gas, the Alliance made various proclamations assuring our foreign part-
ners that the individual states still support the Paris Agreement and will continue to 
adhere to its provisions regardless of federal action. 
Along with the Alliance, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Cal-
ifornian Governor Jerry Brown have launched another group advocating for the Paris 
Agreement called America’s Pledge.11  After being asked about America’s Pledge, 
Bloomberg announced that “we want the world to know: The U.S. will meet our Paris 
commitment, and, through a partnership among American cities, states, and busi-
nesses, we will seek to remain part of the Paris Agreement process.”12  In contrast to 
the constitutional separation of state and federal powers inherent in our federalist 
system, Mr. Bloomberg’s comments are out of line and delve into the preempted field 
of foreign affairs.13  The Alliance and America’s Pledge are very similar and both 
advocate for large scale deviation from federal policy.  While states have the power 
to pledge themselves in favor of increased restrictions on environmental regulation, 
the problem arises when they intermingle their domestic roles with foreign diplo-
macy.  
This Note considers recent legislation, diplomatic action, and statements made 
by state officials, and makes the primary contention that the environment in which 
we find ourselves in tips dangerously towards a constitutional crisis.  States have 
been siphoning federal power without any pushback from the government, and based 
on a historical review, the state actors in question have reacted with novel responses.  
Incredibly, within the past fifty years the Supreme Court has only issued two opinions 
regarding state action and the dormant foreign affairs power,14 so further contribution 
to this field is sorely needed.  In Part I, this Note will analyze the growing opposition 
towards President Trump’s stance on the Paris Agreement.  Next, in Part II, this Note 
will argue that the foreign affairs power is solely the province of the federal govern-
ment based on precedent and constitutional authority.  Lastly, this Note will consider 
whether states have encroached on this power in the past and distinguish cultural 
connections with political statements.  
                                                          
9    Id. 
10  Lisa Friedman, A Shadow Delegation Stalks the Official U.S. Team at Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/climate/un-climate-talks-bonn.html?_r=0. 
11  About America’s Pledge, AM.’S PLEDGE, https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/. 
12  Robinson Meyer, 'America's Pledge': Can States and Cities Really Address Climate Change? THE 
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/can-states-and-cities-really-
commit-to-the-paris-agreement/528945///. 
13  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). 
14  Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
  
106 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:5] 
I.CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
A. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
 
Despite the merits of the Paris Agreement, state action intended to conflict with 
federal foreign affairs power violates the basic tenets of federalism and the dormant 
foreign affairs power.  Bringing in many states, the pledges made within the Alliance 
and America’s Pledge have inspired anti-federalist pieces of legislation.  While states 
have the power to legislate on climate change, they do not have the power to pair 
those bills with statements of foreign policy.  When President Trump announced the 
American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on June 1, 2017, he was speaking 
for the entirety of the United States, not just the federal government.15  The federal 
government has exclusive domain over foreign affairs, and while the states have the 
power to pass bills addressing their individual emissions rates, they are nonetheless 
barred by legislating in reference to international agreements.  
On June 6, 2017, Hawaii made history as its legislature passed a bill explicitly 
purporting to adopt the goals of the Paris Agreement.16  The language in the Hawaiian 
bill is a provocative piece of legislation because it exists in direct contrast to the po-
sition of the administration and directly addresses issues of foreign affairs.  Claiming 
that “[r]egardless of federal action, the legislature supports the goals of the Paris 
Agreement to combat climate change,”17 the Hawaiian legislature affirmatively out-
lined their position as contrary to the administration.  Furthermore, the bill promises 
to take up their fair “share of obligations within the expectations apportioned to the 
United States in the Paris Agreement, regardless of federal action.”18 
Similar to the situation in Hawaii, the Washington State Legislature also pro-
posed a bill in the House on June 14, 2017, which claims to adopt the Paris Agree-
ment.19  House Bill 2225 uses substantially similar language to the Hawaiian bill and 
also notes that, “notwithstanding the June 1, 2017, [sic] announcement that the 
United States would withdraw from the 2015 Paris climate agreement, Washington 
state intends to fulfill its portion of the United States’ commitment . . .”20  The spon-
sor of the bill, Representative Vandana Slatter, commented that even though the fed-
eral government was being “shortsighted,” there was room for the states of Washing-
ton to lead and for all representatives to take action on a state level.21 
Massachusetts has also disregarded the federal government’s exclusive claim to 
                                                          
15  Shear, supra note 1, at 1. 
16 Merrit Kennedy, Hawaii Signs Legislation to Implement Goals Of Paris Climate Accord Anyway, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/07/531882630/hawaii-
signs-legislation-to-implement-goals-of-paris-climate-accord-anyway. 
17 S.B. 559, 2017 Leg., 29th Sess. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ses-
sion2017/bills/SB559_CD1_.htm. 
18  Id.  
19 H.B. 2225, 65th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2017), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?Bill-
Number=2225&Year=2017. 
20  Id. at § 1, cl. 2. 
21  Washington House Democrats, Slatter Introduces Legislation to Align Washington with 2015 Paris 
Climate Agreement, WASH. H. DEMOCRATS (June 14, 2017), https://housedemocrats.wa.gov/press-re-
leases/slatter-introduces-legislation-to-align-washington-with-2015-paris-climate-agreement/. 
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set the national agenda for foreign policy.  Introduced on November 1, 2017, the 
House overwhelmingly voted to approve bill H 3994 which makes Massachusetts a 
“non-party stakeholder” in the Paris Agreement.22  Upon initial glance, the term 
“non-party stakeholder” seems to avoid explicit ratification of an agreement.  Perhaps 
the result of legal advice is to prevent incursion into the treaty power, but such an 
analysis would miss the main point that the proposed bill is nonetheless an overreach 
into foreign affairs and could still be enforced as a treaty.  The bill’s definition of 
“non–party stakeholder” gives room for cities and towns to adhere to the guidelines 
of the Paris Agreement, and while the term “ratification” isn’t explicitly used, they 
are still functionally adopting the Accords.23  While one State Senate representative 
noted that the bill amounted to “running in place” on regulations aimed at decreasing 
emissions,24 passage of the bill in both houses is not a requirement to be considered 
an interference in foreign affairs.  
Though Hawaii, Washington and Massachusetts all presented legislation to di-
rectly join or adhere to the Paris Agreement, Maryland’s legislation is unique because 
it instead orders the Governor to join the Climate Alliance group founded by Gover-
nors Jerry Brown, Andrew Cuomo, and Jay Inslee.25  Introduced days apart in January 
of 2018, the House26 and Senate27 bills both contained similar language requiring the 
governor to include Maryland as a member in the Climate Alliance and prohibiting 
the governor from terminating membership therein.  As a result of such bicameral 
consensus, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan sent out a letter to the Climate Alliance 
outlining his commitment to participation and leadership with them.28  The letter also 
mentioned Governor Hogan’s disagreement with President Trump’s decision to pull 
out of the Paris Agreement and his hope of collaboration going forward.29  On May 
15, 2018, the House bill passed and was signed into law by Governor Hogan, making 
it the first direct order from a state legislative body to conduct foreign diplomacy.30 
 
 
                                                          
22  Katie Lannan, Mass. House Votes to Commit State to Goals of Paris Climate Accord, WBUR NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/11/02/house-votes-climate-change-accord. 
23 H.B. 3994, 2017 Leg., 190th Sess. § 2 (Mass. 2017), 
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H3994/BillHistory?pageNumber=1&direction=asc&sortColumn=BillHisto
ryDateTime. 
24  Katie Lannan, Mass. House Votes to Commit State To Goals of Paris Climate Accord, WBUR NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2017) https://www.wbur.org/news/2017/11/02/house-votes-climate-change-accord. 
25  Scott Dance, Maryland Will Join Alliance of States Supporting Paris Climate Agreement, Hogan 
Says, BALT. SUN (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/environment/bs-md-hogan-
climate-alliance-20180110-story.html. 
26  H.B. 003, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB3/2018. 
27 S.B. 0138, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2018RS/bills/sb/sb0138f.pdf. 
28  Letter to the Executive Director of the U.S. Climate Alliance, Julie Cerqueira, on January 10, 2018, 
BALT. SUN (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/environment/bal-document-hogan-
climate-alliance-20180110-htmlstory.html. 
29  Id. 
30  H.B. 003, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB3/2018. 
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B.  FOREIGN AGREEMENTS 
 
Led by Governor Brown, California has been a major player in positioning itself 
as an antagonist to federal climate policy.  Following President Trump’s decision to 
pull out of the Paris Agreement, the governor has increased foreign travel, diplomatic 
meetings, and trade negotiations abroad.31  Governor Brown has heavily increased 
California-China relations through signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
and frequent trips to Beijing.32  Generally, it is only presidents or secretaries of states 
who take the role in signing Memoranda of Understanding.  While these agreements 
are not typically considered treaties or contracts in the common law, other law sys-
tems give them significant weight.  A Chinese MOU in particular could be viewed as 
legally binding, and considering that China has a civil law system, the idea of a good 
faith negotiation would be equivalent to that of a contract.33  Binding or not, it is not 
the role of governors to interfere with international relations and confuse foreign ac-
tors as to who has legitimate power to negotiate.  From the perspective of a foreign 
nation, discussing policy with conflicting representatives could be seen as strange at 
best or could be used for a tactical diplomatic advantage at worst.  
In what seemed to be a planned trip, days after President Trump announced that 
the United States was pulling out of the Paris Agreement on June 1st, Governor 
Brown flew to China the following Saturday to start a five-day diplomatic tour.34  
While abroad, Governor Brown signed agreements with the cities of Beijing, 
Chengdu, and Nanjing, launched a California-Haidian District Innovation Center, 
and promoted his “Under2 Coalition” which seeks to join national and subnational 
units of government around the world in the fight against climate change.35  In par-
ticular, the Under2 Coalition seeks international alliance in promoting the Paris 
Agreement, and the conference was able to inspire five new members to join: Den-
mark, Indian state Chhattisgarh, the French region of Brittany, the South African 
province of KawZulu-Natal and the South African province of Western Cape.36  The 
Under2 Coalition has the same aims as the Climate Alliance and America’s Pledge, 
and along with encouraging membership, Governor Brown was able to attract more 
                                                          
31  Stewart M. Patrick, California Seizes Climate Leadership After Trump Abandons Paris Accord, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/california-seizes-climate-leadership-af-
ter-trump-abandons-paris-accord.  
32  Memorandum of Understanding from Edmund G. Brown, Governor, State of California, on Estab-
lishing “China Provinces and U.S. California Joint Working Group on Trade and Investment Cooperation”, to 
Zhou Shengxian, Minister of Environmental Protection, China (Apr. 10, 2013). http://www.cli-
matechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/intergovernmental/MOU-Min_of_Commerce_China.pdf. 
33  Dan Harris, Understanding a Chinese Memorandum of Understanding, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danharris/2016/08/30/understanding-a-chinese-memorandum-of-understand-
ing/#ae71cbc7bf0b. 
34  Jessica Meyers, Jerry Brown in China with a Climate Message to the World: Don't Follow Ameri-
ca's Lead, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-brown-china-20170607-
story.html. 
35  Governor Brown to Expand California’s Climate Partnership with China in Chengdu, Nanjing and 
Beijing, OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (June 2, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19821. 
36  Governor Brown Opens Under2 Clean Energy Forum, Welcomes New Under2 Coalition Global 
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attention to his causes with these meetings. 
Referencing Governor Brown’s Under2 Coalition, the chief director of environ-
mental sustainability from the Western Cape claimed that it was encouraging to hear 
“. . . that the voice of America is lots of voices and that they differ and that they’re 
not the same voices coming out of the White House.”37  While this may be viewed as 
a positive development for other nations if they disagree with American policy, it is 
surely a detriment to our system of government when we no longer speak with one 
voice.  Public perception of Governor Brown’s trip has been observant of a strong 
rift between the states and their federal government.  The Los Angeles Times called 
Brown’s trip a “diplomatic coup” because compared to Energy Secretary Rick 
Perry’s minimal contribution to the Clean Energy Forum in Beijing, Governor Brown 
was holding productive and extended meetings with President Xi Jinping.38  
 




 Governor Brown has been the most active state governor when it comes to for-
eign travel and funded in part by non-profits like the Climate Registry and Climate 
Action Reserve,39 he has used his resources to travel to China, Russia, the Vatican, 
and the European Union.  Along with signing agreements in China, he also gave a 
lecture at Tsinghua University promoting the necessary academic contributions to 
climate science and the need for young people to rise to the responsibility.40  More 
importantly, this Note does not seek to analyze Governor Brown’s criticism of the 
Trump administration, which he is well within his rights to do, but rather to criticize 
his promotion of a foreign treaty.  In the speech to Tsinghua, he mentioned the need 
to stand up for the goals of the Paris Agreement and his intention to persuade other 
states to adhere to their commitments.41 
 Following his tour in China, Governor Brown also went to Vladivostok, Russia 
for the third annual Eastern Economic Forum to discuss collaboration.42  He spoke at 
a panel titled “The Russia-China-Japan-U.S. Quadrangle: Are There Opportunities 
for Cooperation?” and made a statement to Russian news organization RT that he 
                                                          
37  Jessica Meyers, China Is Now Looking To California – Not Trump – To Help Lead The Fight 
Against Climate Change, LA TIMES (Jun. 6, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-global-
climate-20170606-story.html. 
38  Id. 
39 Gov. Brown Heads to Europe for Climate Talks, CBS SACRAMENTO (Oct. 31, 2017, 2:06 PM), 
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2017/10/31/climate-change-jerry-brown-europe/.  
40  China Day 5: Governor Brown Closes California-China Climate Mission with Call to Action: “It’s 
Not a Time for Inertia, It’s a Time for Radical Change,” OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (June 8, 
2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19834.  
41  Id.  
42 Governor Brown to Attend Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok Next Week, OFF. OF GOV. ED-
MUND G. BROWN JR. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19926.  
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was looking to pioneer a “positive path” with Russia despite the economic sanc-
tions.43  In an effort to understand Governor Brown’s intentions in travelling to Rus-
sia, Pravda, a pro-government Russian newspaper, made the observation that Cali-
fornia and Texas often make a point of “flaunting their disobedience” with the federal 
government.44  Creating a reputation for our states as rogue actors makes it difficult 
for American allies and foreign counterparts to take negotiations seriously. 
 Accompanied by U.S. House Representative Scott Peters, Governor Brown also 
led a delegation to the Vatican to discuss climate change policy.45  Attending the 
conference days before the U.S. ambassador to the Vatican arrived, Brown urged 
Vatican officials to continue their support of climate science and emissions regula-
tion.  Along with his encouragement to continue international collaboration, Gover-
nor Brown also used that forum to criticize the administration’s policy by stating that 
President Trump doesn’t reflect the opinions of the majority of Americans regarding 
climate change and that the administration has created an absurd situation in Ameri-
can public life.46  Criticism of the government is a healthy American pastime, but it 
should not interfere with foreign affairs when the speaker holds public office and is 
acting in an official capacity. 
 The Vatican trip was part of a larger 10-day European tour in November 2017 
which included addresses to the President of the European Parliament, press confer-
ences, and meetings with scientists.47  After Governor Brown’s efforts in Brussels to 
create a framework for a common carbon market with Europe and China, the presi-
dent of the European Parliament said that, “[t]he approach of Mr. Trump at a global 
level is not necessarily as helpful as it might be. But we are delighted to have Gov. 
Brown here because it shows there is a strong commitment from the U.S.”48  That 
same day Governor Brown traveled to Stuggart, Germany to address the Baden-
Wuerttemberg state assembly and argued that the world is looking to California for 
leadership on climate change.  He vowed that the United States would eventually sign 
on to the Paris Agreement and that “[t]he States are coming back.”49 
 Meeting with Norway’s Prime Minister Erna Solberg, Governor Brown was 
                                                          
43 Relations between US & Russia Can Get 'Much Better' – California Governor to RT, RT 
(Sept. 7, 2017, 4:40 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/402221-us-russia-california-governor/.  
44 Alexander Artamonov, Трампу Nередали "привет" с Дальнего Востока [Trump Was Given a 
“Hello” From the Far East], PRAVDA.RU (July 9, 2017), https://www.pravda.ru/authored/07-09-
2017/1347820-brown-0/.  
45  Michael J. O’Loughlin, Gov. Jerry Brown Urges Religious Leaders to Fight Climate Change at Vat-
ican Conference, AM. MAG. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-soci-
ety/2017/11/06/gov-jerry-brown-urges-religious-leaders-fight-climate-change-vatican. 
46  Chris Collins, California Governor Uses Vatican Conference to Attack Trump on Climate Change, 
CRUX (Nov. 5, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2017/11/05/california-governor-uses-vatican-conference-
attack-trump-climate-change/.   
47  Chris Megerian, Gov. Jerry Brown Plans Climate Trip to Vatican, Belgium, Norway and Germany, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-
jerry-brown-europe-climate-1509478272-htmlstory.html.  
48  Catherine Stupp, Gov. Jerry Brown and European Union Leaders Agree to Work to Combat Climate 
Change, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-brussels-eu-jerry-brown-
20171107-story.html.  
49  Natasha Bach, Hailed As the 'Anti-Trump,' California Governor Jerry Brown Delivers a Blunt Cli-
mate Change Message in Germany, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/09/jerry-brown-
governor-climate-change-trump/.  
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able to discuss climate goals with a fellow member of the Under2 initiative and par-
ticipate in a round table of scientists and policy experts.50  Considering that member-
ship in Under2 outlines future collaboration and agreements going forward, this 
meeting with Prime Minister Solberg would have been considered a diplomatic visit 
with an ally if Governor Brown had been acting as a president.  As it stands, Governor 
Brown’s visit to Oslo primarily revolved around recent scientific studies and evi-
dence of climate change strategies.51  The meeting with the Prime Minister at the 
official residence was a policy meeting about energy policy and set the tone for the 
rest of the visit.52  When state actors attempt to shape federal policy, they violate the 
Constitution by stepping out of bounds.  Governor Brown’s visit would have been 
normal for a representative of the State Department, but as a state governor, his ac-
tions have confused foreign powers and left federal diplomatic staff at a terrible dis-
advantage.  
B. U.N BONN CONFERENCE 
 
 While diplomatic intervention from state-level actors is problematic when 
viewed on a case-by-case basis, challenges to federal power becomes more apparent 
when unlawful intervention is formally accepted by international actors.  State activ-
ism reached a high point during the United Nations climate conference in Bonn, Ger-
many when two American delegations attended to present opposing viewpoints on 
how to solve the climate crisis.53  While the Trump administration sent in a team of 
negotiators to the conference,54 a separate delegation composed of American gover-
nors, mayors, and state senators also arrived to advocate in favor of the Paris Agree-
ment.55  This conference was meant to be attended by foreign dignitaries with agency 
power from their respective nation-states, but with two delegations in attendance, the 
United States presented the world with a split-level offer of diplomacy. 
 The state-led delegation was, unsurprisingly, led by California Governor Jerry 
Brown.  As the primary stakeholder in several of the state activist groups mentioned 
earlier in this Note, Governor Brown has been one of the most outspoken critics of 
federal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.  Prior to the conference, Governor 
Brown was appointed by the U.N. conference president, Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank 
                                                          
50  Governor Brown Meets with Norway's Prime Minister, Convenes First-of-its-Kind Gathering of 
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Bainimarama, to be a “special advisor for states and regions that have assumed an 
increasingly important role after Trump’s vow to leave the Paris Accord.”56  This 
appointment served as a formal recognition in the shift of power within American 
foreign policy. 
 The New York Times called the state-led delegation the “shadow delegation,”57 
and the appearance of both groups prompted confused reactions to the dual American 
representation from foreign delegates at the conference.  However, some officials 
preferred to ignore the official delegation entirely in favor of the shadow delegation.  
One policy expert from the Union of Concerned Scientists made the claim that the 
world should listen to the unofficial delegation instead of the party led by the Amer-
ican government because they “truly represent the interests of Americans, they are 
closer to public opinion on this.”58  The shadow delegation set up a “US Climate 
Action Center” which served as a pavilion at the conference to share their views and 
climate priorities.59  At the opening of the pavilion, state senator Ricardo Lara men-
tioned that “[d]espite what happens in DC, we’re still here.”60 
II. DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER & FEDERALISM 
 
While the foreign affairs power is an implied constitutional power of the federal 
government, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that this power is exclusive to 
the executive and that it “cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the 
part of the several states.”61  Moreover, the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject has 
reasoned that the President is specifically and uniquely empowered to conduct for-
eign affairs.62  Having established that federal preemption is judged in relation be-
tween state action and executive decision-making, it becomes imperative to establish 
what a showing of executive action means in the context of foreign affairs.  In the 
landmark case, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a California law requiring foreign insurance companies to disclose their 
records with the aim of compensating victims of the Holocaust.63  Garamendi repre-
sented an expansion of previous case law64 wherein state laws were only invalidated 
if they conflicted with executive actions that had the force of law like treaties and 
executive agreements with preemption clauses.65  Now, state legislation will be 
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preempted if it conflicts with an expressly stated foreign policy objective of the ex-
ecutive.66  
This section of the Note will serve to provide a detailed background of the juris-
prudence and precedent surrounding the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the Su-
preme Court’s historic balance of federalism.  Though there is a dearth of opinions 
on this matter, with state challenges to federal power on the rise, it is likely that the 
Supreme Court will bring the matter to review once more if states continue to legis-
late and interfere with foreign affairs.  
A. CROSBY V. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL 
 
In the first dormant foreign affairs case examined by the Supreme Court, Crosby 
v. National Foreign Trade Council,67 we saw that a state law in Massachusetts limit-
ing business with Burma was an unconstitutional use of state power.  The Massachu-
setts legislature wanted to place regulations on products from Burma because of ide-
ological differences resulting in a ten percent mark-up for blacklisted companies 
competing for government contracts.  If these particular companies still conducted 
business with Burma, Massachusetts had the ability to sanction them in order to have 
a subsidiary effect on Burmese business.   
Months later, Congress passed its own sanctions bill on Burma and directed the 
Treasury Secretary to deny loans, entry visas, and put a hold on foreign direct invest-
ment until there were measurable improvements on human rights enforcement and 
democratic ideals.  However, Crosby established that even if the executive agrees 
with the state, it ruins the “one voice” concept.  Here the Court made the decision 
that the state legislation interfered with diplomacy because the President’s negotiat-
ing power is diminished when there emerges the possibility that enclaves within the 
country will not adhere to the international agreement.  The Court observed that “the 
state Act stands as an obstacle in addressing the congressional obligation to devise a 
comprehensive, multilateral strategy.”68  
By using Crosby’s “obstacles conflict” preemption, we can make the reasonable 
conclusion that the legislation passed in favor of adopting the policies of the Paris 
Agreement would serve as an obstacle to the current administration.  With a particular 
eye towards the ability of the President to negotiate, such statutes effectively wipe 
out any bargaining power to negotiate our way back in to the Paris Agreement.  Re-
gardless of whether or not a renegotiation is good policy, President Trump has no 
bargaining power if the top economies within the state are already signed on in spirit 
if not in pen.  California, the biggest actor in promoting the Climate Alliance and 
diplomacy, has the largest economy of all the states and would have the seventh larg-
est economy in the world if it was its own nation.  What would there be left to bargain 
with once compliance with the Paris Agreement has marked the most economically 
significant states? 
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B. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. GARAMENDI 
 
In another dormant foreign affairs case, American Insurance Association v. Gar-
amendi, a California law was struck down because it was judged to limit the ability 
of the executive to speak with “one voice.”69  The state tried to regulate insurance 
reparations for stolen property after World War II, and even though both the state and 
the federal government were in agreement that the predominately Jewish plaintiffs 
should get their property back, the state action was still in conflict with federal (ex-
ecutive) negotiations.  Even though the Supreme Court in Garamendi conceded that 
the states traditionally had the power to regulate estate law, they nonetheless ruled 
against the Californian statute because they determined the statute had a “direct im-
pact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central 
government.”70 
Garamendi changed the way preemption was enforced because it struck down a 
statute in the absence of any conflicting treaty or law.71  There, the only conflict was 
between a California statute claiming reparations and the likelihood that the State 
was disturbing foreign relations.  The federal government was engaged in active ne-
gotiations over reparations to the Jewish people, and one of the very first concessions 
received was that there would be no supplementary legal action.72  Even though the 
American government didn’t agree to any future claims, the Court nevertheless said 
that it was an infringement on foreign policy.  Justice Souter came forward with a 
balancing test in the majority opinion and wrote that: [I]t would be reasonable to 
consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, 
when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law 
preempted.”73 
 When you have states separate from the country to try and create their own for-
eign policy, it undermines the effectiveness of the country as a whole.  Before Gara-
mendi, it is likely that current events would not have met the threshold for a cause of 
action for federal preemption.  There is no treaty or federal law in conflict with the 
legislation passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland, and the dip-
lomatic outreach conducted by Governor Brown has been met primarily with silence.  
The executive has not passed any laws regarding the Paris Agreement and despite his 
open comments on the treaty, he has not issued any executive agreements.  In the 
past, the courts have even upheld divestment movements with the express approval 
of the executive branch.74 
After Garamendi, the question becomes: is there a sufficient foreign policy in-
terest?  It seems that the facts of the case in Garamendi create a very low bar for 
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preemption.  The statute did not contain any language adverse to the federal govern-
ment or even intended to operate on the level of foreign policy.75  It only regulated 
business in California and did not “require any inquiry into the policies of any foreign 
government.”76  Knowing that the state was not intending to conduct foreign rela-
tions, the Court invalidated the statute solely on the basis that it “limited the ability 
of the government to speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign affairs.”77 
These pieces of legislation could also be invalidated on the basis that they inter-
fere with foreign policy interests regardless of whether or not it is seen as diplomacy.  
In the past, the government needed an official statute to claim a foreign policy inter-
est, but with Garamendi, mere statements of interest or policy are sufficient to stake 
a claim for interference.  Taking into consideration President Trump’s statements on 
the Paris Agreement, the status of the United States as a signatory on the protocol, 
and the current political relevance, it would be hard to deny that this is a significant 
foreign policy interest of the executive branch.  
In the current political situation, the associations of states, cities, and counties 
who wish to adopt the Paris Agreement are acting above and beyond the relatively 
neutral statute outlined in Garamendi.  By contrast, they directly note in their pieces 
of legislation that they are acting contrary to the federal government’s foreign policy 
and seek to establish independent connections with other nations.  Taking for exam-
ple Hawaii’s bill on adopting the Paris Climate Agreement, we see that the Hawaiian 
legislature affirmatively entered into the sphere of foreign policy by naming the 
treaty.  In fact, Hawaii, Washington, and Massachusetts all passed legislation with 
the intention to adopt the emissions policies outlined in the Paris Climate Agreement.  
With language explicitly acknowledging that they are going against the expressed 
view of the president’s foreign policy, their legislation is likely unconstitutional.  
Maryland’s piece of legislation presents a different sort of problem regarding the 
ability of states to conduct diplomacy on their own.  Instead of using the statute to 
adopt the policies of the Paris Agreement, the Maryland legislature solely forced 
Governor Larry Hogan into signing on as a member to the American Climate Alli-
ance led by Governor Jerry Brown.  However, membership in the Climate Alliance 
by implication means that the state, county, or city is making a commitment to adopt 
the policies outlined in the Paris Agreement.  The difference is that Maryland has 
made their commitment through membership in an organization rather than through 
legislation.  
Regarding the legislation to adopt the tenets of the Paris Agreement, adopting 
the balancing test outlined by Justice Souter would result in an affirmative claim of 
preemption.  The administration has been clear that they consider the Paris Agree-
ment to be an issue they consider important regardless of whether or not they are 
members.  President Trump has had many press conferences, tweets, and statements 
regarding the Paris Agreement, so such a volume of attention would suggest that the 
topic held some priority in the administration.  While there has not been an official 
pushback towards the states undertaking these actions, unofficially, the media has 
                                                          
75  See Steigman, supra note 66, at 475. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 478. 
  
116 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:5] 
reported that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Scott Pruitt, 
was considering an impromptu trip to the Bonn Summit following reports of a 
“shadow delegation.”78  
Even the name of the alternative delegation, “We Are Still In” suggests that states 
have the power to agree to policy without the support of the federal government.79  
When President Trump announced that the United States was pulling out of the Paris 
Agreement, governors and legislators across the country immediately responded with 
their own supplementary plans.  This suggests premeditation in a general resolve for 
our subnational units to break away from the “one voice” policy that has been in place 
since the time of the Founding Fathers.  Despite the representations that the states 
have made, they do not have the ability to conduct foreign policy, either individually 
or collectively in groups. 
Examples of how foreign policy has been affected abound in the numerous arti-
cles detailing confusion over the American position on climate change.  The confu-
sion is so pronounced that some policy experts have suggested that the European 
Union ignore the policy claims made by the federal government.80  Dueling political 
contingents went to the Bonn Summit, and as a result of months of tireless diplomacy, 
European attendees preferred to work with the non-official delegation led by Gover-
nor Jerry Brown of California.  Likely the result of an international tour promoting 
the Paris Agreement, Governor Brown positioned the “We Are Still In” delegation 
as a favorable alternative to the negativity of the Trump Administration.  This shift 
away from working with the federal government as a representative of the United 
States is significant.  The transfer of foreign affairs power is non-delegable.  Further, 
considering the enormous impact that these states have made on the ability of the 
federal government to conduct foreign affairs, there should be no question that there 
have been negative repercussions. 
While the strength of the state interest is very high when it comes to regulating 
carbon emissions, it is doubtful that the Court in Garamendi would disagree with the 
observation that the states could have legislated for restrictions twice as high as those 
outlined in the Paris Agreement without jeopardizing American foreign policy.  It is 
one thing to legislate to set higher regulations, and it is altogether another thing to 
legislate in direct response to treaties and foreign policy.  As it stands, there is a 
wealth of legal literature outlining the preemption questions when states legislate for 
environmental controls instead of the federal government.81  An illustrative example 
would be California’s stringent regulations regarding auto emissions.  The federal 
government allowed a “dual system of control” as long as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency had the power to approve the standards as necessary “to meet serious air 
quality problems.”82  The increased regulation propagated by California also served 
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to encourage innovation in the technology surrounding automobile manufacturing.83   
C.  UNITED STATES V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP. 
 
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court in that case 
ruled that there was a complete preemption of federal executive power in foreign 
affairs.84  The facts in that case revolved around the ability of the President to ban 
certain types of arm sales.85  The Court held that the President has almost complete 
authority to shape foreign affairs and diplomacy without interference even though 
the Constitution does not address the foreign affairs power of the President.86  The 
executive’s exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs predates the Constitution and 
was actually passed down from “Great Britain to the United States as a corporate 
entity by virtue of the law of nations.”87  This argument sometimes doesn’t sit well 
with strict originalists and textualists who look to the Constitution as an end-all-be-
all for our system of government, but let the reader also recall that the Constitution 
does not explicitly outline the idea of separation of powers which we heavily rely on.  
This idea is only logically deduced from basic principles.  
The Court also reasoned that the executive should have broad foreign affairs 
powers since discretion was needed given the inherent delicacy with which matters 
of foreign affairs must be handled.88  The Court didn’t want to limit what the presi-
dent could do regarding his or her relationship with a foreign government because to 
do so would violate the sovereignty of the national government.89  It is highly doubt-
ful that either the founders of our constitution or the Court in Curtiss-Wright would 
have every conceived of the scenario we find ourselves in today.  That the states 
would actively seek to undermine the executive in diplomacy, foreign affairs, and 
even treaty making would have been absurd.  It would have seemed like a self-de-
feating exercise since the federal government naturally speaks on behalf of the states.  
While the current administration may not engender the same level of loyalty that the 
country is used to, there is nonetheless a responsibility to defer to the executive 
branch.  
Heavily used as justification for presidential action in the Bush administration, 
Curtiss-Wright still remains good law.  When President Bush’s government was crit-
icized for their policies on detained actors suspected of terrorism, the administration 
generally responded back with claims that they had authority from the Curtiss-Wright 
Doctrine.90  While the Supreme Court generally refused to apply the Curtiss-Wright 
Doctrine to the detainment of citizens, the statute was still upheld for analysis.  The 
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Court in Curtiss-Wright was likely referring to normal foreign affairs powers, like 
the power to negotiate, engage in diplomacy, and make treaties.  The Court reasoned 
that,  
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as 
a representative of the nation.  He makes treaties with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.  Into the field of negotiation the 
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.91   
D.  YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V. SAWYER 
 
Within the field of foreign affairs, preemption is generally classified into three 
categories: direct conflict with a federal position, incidental effect on foreign affairs, 
or no conflict.92  The current environment regarding state response to the Paris Agree-
ment falls within the first and second category.  The laws are in direct conflict with 
the government’s position since they use language explicitly denying the President’s 
right to make foreign policy decisions for the whole country.  The President can ex-
ercise preemption under the foreign affairs power by nature of the fact that he has 
made his administration’s policy positions known and available to the public.  In 
considering foreign affairs preemption, courts will look to the actual impact of the 
law.  Here, I think it would be plain to say that such legislation actually exists as a 
hindrance to American foreign policy. 
As an implied power, however, foreign affairs preemption analysis regarding 
state activism should be considered the context of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.93  In particular, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown is helpful in 
outlining the general boundaries of executive power in relation to Congress.  Three 
main scenarios help guide this power balance.  The first gives the President the great-
est amount of authority when Congress has either explicitly or implicitly authorized 
the President’s power.  The second is called the “zone of twilight” and applies when 
the President acts in the “absence of congressional authorization or denial of his ac-
tions.”94  Lastly, the third scenario gives the President the lowest amount of power if 
he or she acts contrary to a federal statute.  In this case, executive power is “at its 
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”95 
The facts of the Youngstown case fell into the third category where the President 
was acting within the lowest ebb.  President Truman had just issued an Executive 
Order authorizing the seizure of a steel mill in order to ensure a steady supply of 
materials during the Korean War.  The workers at the mill were about to go on strike, 
and rather than risk a shortage of steel until the negotiations concluded, President 
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Truman thought it would be more expedient to seize the factory.  Claiming that his 
actions were constitutional, he acted solely upon the authority of his Article II power, 
and the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution did not envision such a powerful 
executive. 
Considering the current situation of rogue states and political subunits, Justice 
Jackson would likely consider the President to be operating with implicit favor from 
the legislature considering the historical approval of expanding executive control in 
foreign affairs.  Over time we have steadily expanded the powers of the President 
through the consensus of the legislature.  Looking to this expansion should inform 
our analysis of implicit approval from Congress.  As mentioned earlier in this Note, 
the executive has expansive power under Curtiss-Wright to conduct foreign policy, 
and Congress has mirrored judicial approval with laws of their own expanding the 
power to engage in military action,96 make determinations on embassies and citizen-
ship,97 and organize legal settlements in collaboration with foreign policy objec-
tives.98  
Since President Trump is working within Justice Jackson’s first category, his 
actions are at their fullest strength and state action conflicting with the federal agenda 
should be preempted.  Unlike President Truman, who went against the auspice of 
Congressional approval and drafted an executive order of unprecedented action out-
side of a declared state of emergency, President Trump has only engaged in a time-
tested, traditional power of foreign affairs.  Treaty-making and diplomacy are areas 
of politics reserved for the executive.  There is no zone of twilight, and if the federal 
government was to invalidate the statutes passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachu-
setts, and Maryland, he could.  
Similarly, the federal government could preempt the legislation under the Su-
premacy Clause of the constitution.  There is significantly more information available 
about the Supremacy Clause, and while the administration has not issued any laws 
preventing ratification of the Paris Agreement, preemption could still occur if the 
state law is “inconsistent with the federal law's objectives and undermines uniformity 
in foreign affairs.”99  Preemption can occur when Congress expressly preempts the 
law, if they implicitly preempt the law by occupying a field, or if a state law is in 
conflict with a federal law.100  The field of foreign affairs is occupied by the execu-
tive.  While Congress has the express power to ratify treaties, declare war, and regu-
late foreign commerce, it is the executive branch which has the exclusive power to 
regulate foreign policy.  Ignoring for the moment the question of whether it should 
be the executive or legislative branch that should exercise this power, it is undisputed 
that it does not naturally belong to the states.  
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E.  RAMIFICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In international law, the party on the other side of the deal operates on a subjec-
tive basis without requiring any inquiry into the constitutional system of the propos-
ing state.  The biggest example of the presumption for constitutionality would be the 
international dispute in Denmark v. Norway.101  In that case, the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister said that Denmark would not experience any push back from Norway if the 
Danes continued to inhabit Greenland.  His passive statement was considered to be a 
treaty despite the fact that in Norway, the Foreign Minister doesn’t have authority to 
bind the entire country.102  Denmark v. Norway was the first time a vague, oral agree-
ment was upheld as a binding contract in international law.  The facts would suggest 
an inference, at best, that Norway would allow Denmark to have the land, and yet 
that was sufficient enough. 
Taking into consideration the precedent established by Denmark v. Norway, the 
United States would likely lose if a case was brought to the International Court of 
Justice.  The court would not look into our system of federalism or the precedent 
around actual agency in our own common law.  While many critics question the util-
ity of international law, the Supreme Court made it clear in The Paquete Habana and 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that customary international law is part of 
American common law and that Congressional statutes should be read as consistent 
with international law.103  Therefore, it would be irrelevant that Governor Brown 
doesn’t have the constitutional authority to bind the United States—the International 
Court of Justice will not conduct an inquiry regarding the constitutionality of his ac-
tions.  According to international law, the governor’s apparent, subjective authority 
is all that matters.  
Furthermore, a close look at attribution precedent in international law will show 
that it is possible for a political unit to bind the state as a whole even if the other legal 
party to the controversy is aware of the constitutional background.  There are three 
principles outlined for attributing conduct to the state.104  The first and most relevant 
for the scope of this debate is that the state acts through people exercising the state’s 
machinery of power and authority.  This includes the official organs or agents of the 
state including political subdivisions.  In consideration of the Paris Agreement, a 
governor of the state would be considered an “official organ or political subdivi-
sion.”105  The second principle gives no attribution for non-state actors like private 
persons, mobs, corporations or trade unions, but the third principle attributes agency 
when there is failure to act in a scenario that requires state action.   
In light of the Geneva Convention on the Law of Treaties, there would also be a 
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counter-federalist argument as to what exactly the “organs of the state” are defined 
as.  This could presumably include mayors and governors, but any reviewing court 
would look into the subjective nature of the other side’s belief (in this case China, 
Russia, or the EU) to determine liability.  The question for the court in that case would 
be to ask whether it was possible to bind a state in the U.S., but not the country itself 
in international law. Considering that other nations like Australia, Switzerland, and 
Germany all have political subunits that participate in treaty making and legisla-
tion,106 the court will consider it a likelihood.  This fact could also support the con-
tention that China was operating under the legitimate assumption that Governor 
Brown was constitutionally representing a political subunit. 
 When deciding the question of state responsibility for diplomatic agreements, 
the International Court of Justice does not inquire into the constitutional system of 
the country under analysis.  Federalism is not an assumed characteristic of the con-
stitutional design of a state, and in fact, many states like Australia, Germany, and 
Switzerland allow their political subunits to conduct their own foreign affairs and 
develop treaties.  When considering the sheer number of political subunits in the 
United States that have openly called for ratification of the Paris Agreement within 
their own capacity, this could potentially leave the country open to international lia-
bility within the International Court of Justice.  
Though the Supreme Court’s holding in The Paquete Habanahas been chal-
lenged by Justice Neil Gorsuch in his concurrence in Jesner v. Arab Bank,107 his 
concurrence is not binding law and only serves to suggest an opening for further dis-
cussion on the application of The Paquete Habana..  Practically, this means that de-
spite the fact that every constitutional scholar would agree that a state governor would 
not have the power to hold our entire country liable for his or her actions made in an 
international setting, the International Court of Justice could find the United States in 
breach of its obligations and we would be bound to accept it since The Paquete Ha-
bana is still good law.  Further, any new legal developments in international treaty 
law would bind the United States.  This issue could potentially arise if China ever 
sought to challenge Governor Brown on the enforcement of the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding that they signed in Beijing.  
III. IS DIPLOMACY THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? 
 
A. BACKGROUND ON DIPLOMACY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN STATES 
Cultural connections, like the establishment of sister cities, are not considered to 
be in conflict with the dormant foreign affairs power of the executive.  The reasoning 
behind this is because cultural ties, while politically significant in their own right, do 
not negatively affect the bargaining power of the executive branch.  Recently the 
legitimacy of state action in establishing international cultural connections was chal-
lenged in a case regarding a Comfort Women Statue in Glendale, California, but the 
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Supreme Court declined to address the issue.108  During WWII, Japanese soldiers 
captured, raped, and forced Korean women to be prostitutes in war brothels.  The 
statute commemorated their inhumane treatment and the dignity they still carry de-
spite a lack of accountability.109  Japanese diplomats said that the statute was harming 
relations between the countries and that the cities did not have the power to erect 
them.  The court disagreed and said that this was a constitutional power.110 
The current situation is different from something like the Comfort Women Statue 
because these statements and statutes are not cultural claims but rather economic and 
political alliances that are at odds with the executive.  It would be as if though Glen-
dale passed a divestment statute severing economic ties to Japan instead of allowing 
art to be displayed in a public park.  Logically, allowing states to establish cultural 
connections would help with the public image of the United States and perhaps even 
serve to reinforce American diplomacy without the risk of infringing upon the “one 
voice” policy. 
CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
The actions of the governors, mayors, and state legislatures are likely unconsti-
tutional, and if we want to prevent a dangerous precedent of rogue states from de-
parting from federal foreign policy, the courts should prohibit these actions.  While 
the states of Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland have been the first 
to pass legislation regarding the Paris Agreement, it is unlikely that they will be the 
last.  In fact, it is part of the mission statement for organizations like the Climate 
Alliance to encourage other states to follow their lead.  All of the states that have 
passed this legislation are part of the Climate Alliance, so it can be expected that they 
will supplement their legislation with encouragement.  
The statutes violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine because along with go-
ing against expressed foreign policy from the Trump administration, they effectively 
seek to ratify the Paris Agreement as if they were independent political actors.  While 
these states claim that they have a vested and significant interest in maintaining low 
carbon emissions, this interest is not enough to justify direct conflict with the federal 
government.  States generally have the ability to skirt the grounds of the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine when they are legislating in an area traditionally left under 
the responsibility of the state, but that is not the case regarding diplomacy and foreign 
affairs.  The federal government has always had exclusive domain over appointments 
of ambassadors, foreign affairs, diplomacy, treaty making, and any general agree-
ment with a foreign nation.  While states have the power to engage in cultural ex-
change, like that of applying to be a “sister city,” this is not political, but rather a 
cultural connection unregulated by the foreign government. 
In particular, courts look to the effect that the legislation has had on the federal 
government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs, and in this case, President Trump has 
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been severely limited in his ability to engage the European Union and other allies on 
the topic of re-entry of the Paris Agreement.  Here, we are seeing the effect of violat-
ing the “one voice” policy.  How can the President re-negotiate for entry if he is being 
undermined by factions within our own country?  The legislation and participation in 
international conferences all signal to the world that the United States does not have 
“one voice” but is instead a raucous crowd with competing opinions. 
There is a public policy interest in preventing the states from setting their own 
foreign affairs agenda, because not only does it undermine the authority of the gov-
ernment of the United States, but it also undermines their own expressed interests.  
For example, if the states who joined the Climate Alliance truly want to see American 
involvement in the Paris Agreement, then attempts to undermine the executive’s bar-
gaining position will only serve to limit the possibility of re-joining.  
While the actions of the states and actors mentioned above are unconstitutional 
and should be challenged by the federal government, they also pose a threat in the 
international sphere.  According to customary international law, of which is part of 
American common law, if a government representative enters into a legally binding 
agreement, they will bind their government if the receiving country views that repre-
sentative as having apparent authority.  When Governor Jerry Brown went to China 
and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Chinese President Xi Jinping, his 
actions were perceived as legally binding.  In Chinese law, Memoranda of under-
standing are as legally binding as formal contracts in our system, so the question 
remains as to whom he was binding. 
If China wanted to take us to the International Criminal Court in order to enforce 
Governor Brown’s actions, they would likely win with reliance under established 
precedent from Denmark v. Norway.  In that case, the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
made it seem like they were conceding land, and while there was no mention of a 
contract nor were there any definitive words of acceptance mentioned, it was still 
binding.  So, it is important to tease out the difference between a Foreign Minister 
and a state Governor.  
While it is not immediately apparent that the Chinese President would be acting 
under a reasonable assumption that a Governor has the power to bind a nation, espe-
cially considering the limiting language employed in the MOU, he might have a le-
gitimate assumption that the MOU has the power to bind California as a state.  This 
is unconstitutional because in the American system, states cannot be bound in inter-
national agreements regarding foreign affairs, but an international court is under no 
obligation to inquire after the constitutional system of its prospective litigants.  The 
hypothetical international court would make the argument that such actions would be 
presumed constitutional.  
Practically, if we were taken to the International Court of Justice to argue against 
a claim that a subunit of our government is internationally liable, it would likely spark 
intense disagreement within the United States.  Medellin would be an effective ex-
ample of when the United States did not accept an International Court of Justice pro-
visional ruling and decided instead to act independently.  In that case, the Department 
of Justice filed an amicus brief suggesting that the ruling was optional and encour-
aged Texas to follow through with their criminal proceedings.  President Bush tried 
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to intervene, claiming that the foreign affairs power of the President under Curtiss-
Wright allowed him to force Texas to wait on carrying out their execution sentence 
against the foreign national.  However, Texas responded with the contention that 
criminal law is an area that was traditionally left to the complete regulation by the 
state, and though the executive has extensive foreign affairs powers, that was not one 
of them.  By contrast, legislating on foreign affairs and traveling abroad to conduct 
diplomacy is not a historically protected area in which states have exclusive power.  
The Trump Administration has had very negative relations with many of the 
states under analysis that have set out to promote the Paris Agreement, and while it 
may be difficult to put aside such grudges, it is often necessary.  While partisanship 
is sometimes inevitable, it should not be at the risk of our entire system of govern-
ment.  Scholars may argue against the expanse of the president’s power and the extent 
to which it is the executive or the legislature that has the primary responsibility of 
regulating foreign affairs, but that we have a strong system of federalism has not been 
a serious contention since the Antebellum Period.  
We must encourage reliance on the federalist system lest we suffer the same pit-
falls as the Continental Congress.  There was a reason why the post-war currency 
was volatile, trade was confusing, and why our citizens suffered inconsistent taxes—
the lack of leadership from a unitary executive.  Drawing away from the political 
backdrop inevitable in such a discussion, what would commentators say if individual 
states started levying tariffs against countries the dislike?  Hypothetically, if Califor-
nia started levying tariffs against Saudi Arabia and penalizing all companies associ-
ated with Saudi Arabia, the response would be strongly against such actions.  The 
reasoning behind California’s decision making would not matter because that is 
simply not their role.    
Climate change is a legitimate and dangerous risk to our standard of living, water 
supply, and long-term inhabitance on this planet, but it is not enough to say that the 
threat to an individual state is enough to ignore the constitutional safeguards evident 
in the American constitution and jurisprudence.  Unlike cultural overtures, foreign 
affairs are solely within the province of the federal government.  In our history, there 
has been no recorded time where a state has sent diplomats abroad or contracted with 
foreign allies at the direct expense of the federal government’s foreign policy.  This 
is not to say that states cannot criticize the government, as is done in healthy political 
discourse, but to embrace terms like “shadow delegation” and the “anti-Trump offi-
cial” only signals the deterioration of our united government.  While presidential ad-
ministrations may come and go, the bedrock of our democracy rests on a strong ad-
herence to federalism.  If states wish to become active against the federal government, 
they need not risk the deterioration of our federalist system when there are better 
alternatives of political engagement. 
 
 
 
 
 
